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SKETCH OF THE PRESENTATION
Assumptions : cardinal setting, commensurable evaluations
aggregation of decision criteria
Weighted arithmetic mean
Additive measure
Problem: interaction phenomena ?
Choquet integral
Fuzzy measure
Problem: how to interpret it ?
Behavioral indices :
- global importance of criteria
- influence of criteria
- interaction among criteria
- tolerance of the decision maker
- dispersion of the importance of criteria
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Aggregation in multicriteria decision making
• Alternatives A = {a, b, c, . . . , }
• Criteria N = {1,2, . . . , n}
• Profile a ∈ A −→ (xa1, . . . , xan) ∈ IRn
commensurable partial scores
(defined on the same interval scale)
• Aggregation operator M : IRn → IR
M : [0,1]n → [0,1]
Alternative crit. 1 · · · crit. n global score
a xa1 · · · xan M(xa1, . . . , xan)
b xb1 · · · xbn M(xb1, . . . , xbn)
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Example : Evaluation of students w.r.t. three subjects:
statistics, probability, algebra.
Student St Pr Al
a 19 15 18
b 19 18 15
c 11 15 18
d 11 18 15
−→
St Pr Al
0.95 0.75 0.90
0.95 0.90 0.75
0.55 0.75 0.90
0.55 0.90 0.75
(marks are expressed on a scale from 0 to 20)
An often used operator: the weighted arithmetic mean
WAMω(x) :=
n∑
i=1
ωixi
with ∑i ωi = 1 and ωi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N
ωSt = 35%
ωPr = 35%
ωAl = 30%
 ⇒
Student global evaluation
a 0.750
b 0.872
c 0.725
d 0.732
b Â a Â d Â c
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WAMω(1,0,0) = ωSt = 0.35
WAMω(0,1,0) = ωPr = 0.35
WAMω(1,1,0) = 0.70 !!!
What is the importance of {St,Pr} ?
Definition (Choquet, 1953; Sugeno, 1974)
A fuzzy measure on N is a set function v : 2N → [0,1]
such that
i) v(∅) = 0, v(N) = 1
ii) S ⊆ T ⇒ v(S) ≤ v(T )
v(S) = weight of S
= degree of importance of S
= power of S to make the decision alone
(without the remaining criteria)
A fuzzy measure is additive if
v(S ∪ T ) = v(S) + v(T ) if S ∩ T = ∅
→ independent criteria
v(St,Pr) = v(St) + v(Pr) (= 0.70)
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The discrete Choquet integral
Definition
Let v ∈ FN . The (discrete) Choquet integral of x ∈ IRn
w.r.t. v is defined by
Cv(x) :=
n∑
i=1
x(i)[v(A(i))− v(A(i+1))]
with the convention that x(1) ≤ · · · ≤ x(n).
Also, A(i) = {(i), . . . , (n)}.
Example: If x3 ≤ x1 ≤ x2, we have
Cv(x1, x2, x3) = x3 [v(3,1,2)− v(1,2)]
+ x1 [v(1,2)− v(2)]
+ x2 v(2)
Particular case:
v additive ⇒ Cv =WAMω
Indeed,
Cv(x) =
n∑
i=1
x(i)v((i)) =
n∑
i=1
xi v(i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ωi
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Properties of the Choquet integral
Linearity w.r.t. the fuzzy measure :
There exist 2n functions fT : IRn → IR (T ⊆ N) such that
Cv =
∑
T⊆N
v(T ) fT (v ∈ FN)
Indeed, on can show that
Cv(x) =
∑
T⊆N
v(T )
∑
K⊇T
(−1)|K|−|T |min
i∈K xi︸ ︷︷ ︸
fT (x)
Stability w.r.t. positive linear transformations :
For any x ∈ IRn, r > 0, s ∈ IR,
Cv(r x1+ s, . . . , r xn+ s) = r Cv(x1, . . . , xn) + s
Example : marks obtained by students
- on a [0,20] scale : 16, 11, 7, 14
- on a [0,1] scale : 0.80, 0.55, 0.35, 0.70
- on a [−1,1] scale : 0.60, 0.10, −0.30, 0.40
Remark : The partial scores may be embedded in [0,1]
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Monotonicity
For any x, x′ ∈ IRn, one has
xi ≤ x′i ∀i ∈ N ⇒ Cv(x) ≤ Cv(x′)
Cv is properly weighted by v
Cv(eS) = v(S) (S ⊆ N)
eS = characteristic vector of S in {0,1}n
Example : e{1,3} = (1,0,1,0, . . .)
Independent criteria Dependent criteria
WAMω(e{i}) = ωi Cv(e{i}) = v(i)
WAMω(e{i,j}) = ωi+ ωj Cv(e{i,j}) = v(i, j)
Example :
v(St,Pr) < v(St) + v(Pr)
‖ ‖ ‖
Cv(1,1,0) Cv(1,0,0) Cv(0,1,0)
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Axiomatic characterization of the class of
Choquet integrals with n arguments
Theorem
The operators Mv : IRn → IR (v ∈ FN) are
• linear w.r.t. the underlying fuzzy measure v :
Mv is of the form
Mv =
∑
T⊆N
v(T ) fT (v ∈ FN)
where fT ’s are independent of v
• stable for the positive linear transformations :
Mv(r x1+ s, . . . , r xn+ s) = rMv(x1, . . . , xn) + s
for all x ∈ IRn, r > 0, s ∈ IR
• non-decreasing in each argument (monotonic)
• properly weighted by v :
Mv(eS) = v(S) (S ⊆ N, v ∈ FN)
if and only if Mv = Cv for all v ∈ FN .
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Back to the example of evaluation of students
Student St Pr Al
a 19 15 18
b 19 18 15
c 11 15 18
d 11 18 15
Assumptions :
- St and Pr are more important than Al
- St and Pr are somewhat substitutive
Behavior of the decision maker :
When a student is good at statistics (19), it is preferable that
he/she is better at algebra than probability, so
a Â b
When a student is not good at statistics (11), it is preferable
that he/she is better at probability than algebra, so
d Â c
Additive model : WAMω
a Â b ⇔ ωAl > ωPr
d Â c ⇔ ωAl < ωPr
}
No solution !
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Non-additive model : Cv
v(St) = 0.35
v(Pr) = 0.35
v(Al) = 0.30
v(St,Pr) = 0.50 (redundancy)
v(St,Al) = 0.80 (complementarity)
v(Pr,Al) = 0.80 (complementarity)
v(∅) = 0
v(St,Pr,Al) = 1
Student St Pr Al Global evaluation
a 19 15 18 17.75
b 19 18 15 16.85
c 11 15 18 15.10
d 11 18 15 15.25
a Â b Â d Â c
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Particular cases of Choquet integrals
1) Weighted arithmetic mean
WAMω(x) =
n∑
i=1
ωixi ,
n∑
i=1
ωi = 1, ωi ≥ 0
Proposition
Let v ∈ FN . The following assertions are equivalents :
i) v is additive
ii) ∃ a weight vector ω such that Cv =WAMω
iii) Cv is additive, i.e. Cv(x+ x′) = Cv(x) + Cv(x′)
v(S) =
∑
i∈S
ωi (S ⊆ N)
ωi = v(i) (i ∈ N)
• arithmetic mean (ω = (1/n, . . . ,1/n))
AM(x) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi
• k-th projection (ω = e{k})
Pk(x) = xk
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2) Ordered weighted averaging (Yager, 1988)
OWAω(x) =
n∑
i=1
ωix(i) ,
n∑
i=1
ωi = 1, ωi ≥ 0
with the convention that x(1) ≤ · · · ≤ x(n).
Proposition (Grabisch, 1995)
Let v ∈ FN . The following assertions are equivalents :
i) v is cardinality-based : |S| = |S′| ⇒ v(S) = v(S′)
ii) ∃ a weight vector ω such that Cv = OWAω
iii) Cv is a symmetric function.
v(S) =
n∑
i=n−s+1
ωi (S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅)
ωn−s = v(S ∪ i)− v(S) (i ∈ N,S ⊆ N \ i)
• arithmetic mean (ω = (1/n, . . . ,1/n))
• k-th order statistic (ω = e{k})
OSk(x) = x(k)
Note. If n = 2k − 1 then OSk = median
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3) Partial minima and maxima
Let T ⊆ N , with T 6= ∅.
minT (x) = min
i∈T xi
v(S) =
{
1 if S ⊇ T
0 else
maxT (x) = max
i∈T xi
v(S) =
{
1 if S ∩ T 6= ∅
0 else
• minimum (T = N)
v(S) =
{
1 if S = N
0 else
• maximum (T = N)
v(S) =
{
1 if S 6= ∅
0 else
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Behavioral analysis of aggregation
Given a fuzzy measure v ∈ FN ,
how can we interpret it ?
↓
Behavioral indices
global importance of criteria
influence of criteria
interaction among criteria
tolerance / intolerance of the decision maker
dispersion of the importance of criteria
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Global importance of criteria
Given i ∈ N , it may happen that
• v(i) = 0
• v(T ∪ i)À v(T ) for many T ⊆ N \ i
The overall importance of i ∈ N should not be solely deter-
mined by v(i), but by all v(T ∪ i) such that T ⊆ N \ i.
Marginal contribution of i in combination T ⊆ N \ i :
v(T ∪ i)− v(T )
Shapley power index (Shapley, 1953)
= Average value of the marginal contribution of i alone in all
combinations :
φ(v, i) :=
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
1(
n−1
t
) ∑
T⊆N\i
|T |=t
[v(T ∪ i)− v(T )]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
average over all the subsets
of the same size t
φ(v, i) =
∑
T⊆N\i
(n− t− 1)! t!
n!
[v(T ∪ i)− v(T )]
(proposed in MCDM by Murofushi in 1992)
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Properties of the Shapley power index
i) φ(v, i) ∈ [0,1] for all i ∈ N
ii)
∑
i φ(v, i) = 1
iii) v additive ⇒ φ(v, i) = v(i) for all i ∈ N
Axiomatic characterization
Theorem (Shapley, 1953)
The numbers ψ(v, i) (i ∈ N, v ∈ FN)
• are linear w.r.t. the fuzzy measure v :
ψ(v, i) is of the form
ψ(v, i) =
∑
T⊆N
v(T ) piT (i ∈ N, v ∈ FN)
where piT ’s are independent of v
• are symmetric, i.e., independent of the labels :
ψ(v, i) = ψ(piv, pi(i)) (i ∈ N, v ∈ FN)
for any permutation pi on N
• fulfill the “null criterion” axiom :
v(T ∪ i) = v(T ) ∀T ⊆ N \ i ⇒ ψ(v, i) = 0
• fulfill the “efficiency” axiom :
n∑
i=1
ψ(v, i) = 1 (v ∈ FN)
if and only if ψ = φ (Shapley power index).
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v φ(v, i)
vWAMω ωi
vOWAω 1/n
Probabilistic interpretation
Define
∆i Cv(x) := Cv(x | xi = 1)− Cv(x | xi = 0)
(marginal contribution of criterion i on the aggregation at x)
We have
φ(v, i) =
∫
[0,1]n
∆i Cv(x) dx
that is,
φ(v, i) = E[∆i Cv(x)]
where the expectation is defined from the uniform distribu-
tion over [0,1]n.
φ(v, i) = expected value of the amplitude of the range of
Cv that criterion i may control when assigning partial evalu-
ations to the other criteria at random
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Influence of criteria on the aggregation
Marginal contribution of S ⊆ N in combination T ⊆ N \ S :
v(T ∪ S)− v(T )
The influence of S on the aggregation operator Cv is defined
as the average value of the marginal contribution of S in all
outer combinations :
I(Cv, i) := 1
n− s+1
n−s∑
t=0
1(
n−s
t
) ∑
T⊆N\S
|T |=t
[v(T ∪ S)− v(T )]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
average over all the subsets
of the same size t
Properties of the influence function
i) I(Cv, S) ∈ [0,1] for all S ⊆ N
ii) I(Cv, i) = φ(v, i) for all i ∈ N
iii) v additive ⇒ I(Cv, S) = v(S) for all S ⊆ N
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Cv I(Cv, S)
WAMω
∑
i∈S
ωi
OWAω
1
n− s+1
n∑
i=1
ωi min(i, s, n− i+1, n− s+1)
Probabilistic interpretation
We have
I(Cv, S) =
∫
[0,1]n
[Cv(x | xS = 1)− Cv(x | xS = 0)] dx
that is,
I(Cv, S) = E[Cv(x | xS = 1)− Cv(x | xS = 0)]
I(Cv, S) = expected value of the amplitude of the range of
Cv that criteria S may control when assigning partial evalu-
ations to the other criteria at random
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Interaction among criteria
Consider a pair {i, j} of criteria. If
v(T ∪ ij)− v(T ∪ i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
contribution of j in
the presence of i
< v(T ∪ j)− v(T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
contribution of j in
the absence of i
(T ⊆ N\ij)
then there is an overlap effect between i and j.
Marginal interaction between i and j, conditioned to the
presence of T ⊆ N \ ij :
v(T ∪ ij)− v(T ∪ i)− v(T ∪ j) + v(T )
< 0 → i and j are competitive
> 0 → i and j are complementary
= 0 → i and j do not interact
Interaction index (Owen, 1972)
= Average value of the marginal interaction between i and
j :
I(v, ij) :=
1
n− 1
n−2∑
t=0
1(
n−2
t
) ∑
T⊆N\ij
|T |=t
[v(T ∪ ij)− . . .]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
average over all the subsets
of the same size t
(proposed in MCDM by Murofushi and Soneda in 1993)
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Probabilistic interpretation
Define
∆ij Cv(x) = ∆i∆j Cv(x)
= Cv(x | xi = xj = 1)− Cv(x | xi = 1, xj = 0)
−Cv(x | xi = 0, xj = 1)+ Cv(x | xi = xj = 0)
(marginal interaction between i and j at x)
We have
I(v, ij) =
∫
[0,1]n
∆ij Cv(x) dx
= E[∆ij Cv(x)]
Generalization to any combination S
(Grabisch and Roubens, 1998)
I(v, S) := E[∆S Cv(x)]
I(v, S) =
∑
T⊆N\S
(n− t− s)! t!
(n− s+1)!
∑
K⊆S
(−1)s−kv(K ∪ T )
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Properties of the interaction
i) I(v, ij) ∈ [−1,1] for all ij ∈ N
ii) I(v, i) = φ(v, i) for all i ∈ N
iii) v additive ⇒ I(v, S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N, |S| ≥ 2
v I(v, S), |S| ≥ 2
vWAMω 0
vOWAω
1
n− s+1
s−2∑
i=1
(s− 2
i
)
(−1)s−i(ωs−i−1 − ωn−i)
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Conjunction and disjunction degrees
Average value of Cv over [0,1]n :
E[Cv(x)] =
∫
[0,1]n
Cv(x) dx
→ gives the average position of Cv within the interval [0,1].
Since
minxi ≤ Cv(x) ≤ maxxi
we have
E(min) ≤ E(Cv) ≤ E(max)
Conjunction degree :
andness(Cv) := E(max)− E(Cv)
E(max)− E(min)
Disjunction degree :
orness(Cv) := E(Cv)− E(min)
E(max)− E(min)
(Dujmovic´, 1974)
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Properties
i) andness(Cv),orness(Cv) ∈ [0,1]
ii) andness(Cv) + orness(Cv) = 1
iii) orness(Cv) = 0 (resp. 1) ⇔ Cv = min (resp. max)
We have
orness(Cv) = 1
n− 1
n−1∑
t=1
1(
n
t
) ∑
T⊆N
|T |=t
v(T )
︸ ︷︷ ︸
average over all
the subsets of
the same size t
Cv orness(Cv)
WAMω 1/2
OWAω
1
n− 1
n∑
i=1
(i− 1)ωi︸ ︷︷ ︸
as proposed
by Yager in 1988
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Veto and favor effects
A criterion i ∈ N is
• a veto for Cv if
Cv(x) ≤ xi (x ∈ [0,1]n)
• a favor for Cv if
Cv(x) ≥ xi (x ∈ [0,1]n)
(Dubois and Koning, 1991; Grabisch, 1997)
Proposition
1) i is a veto for Cv iff ∃ λ ∈ [0,1[ s.t.
xi ≤ λ ⇒ Cv(x) ≤ λ
2) i is a favor for Cv iff ∃ λ ∈ ]0,1] s.t.
xi ≥ λ ⇒ Cv(x) ≥ λ
Problem :
Given i ∈ N and v ∈ FN , how can we define a degree of
veto (resp. favor) of i for Cv ?
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First attempt :
Consider [0,1]n as a probability space with uniform distri-
bution
veto(Cv, i) := Pr[Cv(x) ≤ xi]
However,
Pr[WAMω(x) ≤ xi] =
{
1 if ωi = 1
1/2 else
is non-continuous w.r.t. the fuzzy measure !!!
Second attempt : axiomatic characterization
veto(Cv, i) := 1− 1
n− 1
∑
T⊆N\i
(n− t− 1)! t!
(n− 1)! v(T )
favor(Cv, i) := 1
n− 1
∑
T⊆N\i
(n− t− 1)! t!
(n− 1)! v(T∪i)−
1
n− 1
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Theorem
The numbers ψ(Cv, i) (i ∈ N, v ∈ FN)
• are linear w.r.t. the fuzzy measure v :
ψ(Cv, i) is of the form
ψ(Cv, i) =
∑
T⊆N
v(T ) piT (i ∈ N, v ∈ FN)
where piT ’s are independent of v
• are symmetric, i.e., independent of the labels :
ψ(Cv, i) = ψ(Cpiv, pi(i)) (i ∈ N, v ∈ FN)
for any permutation pi on N
• fulfill the “boundary” axiom : ∀T ⊆ N, ∀i ∈ T
ψ(minT , i) = 1
(cf. minT(x) ≤ xi whenever i ∈ T )
• fulfill the “normalization” axiom :
ψ(Cv, i) = ψ(Cv, j) ∀i, j ∈ N
⇓
ψ(Cv, i) = andness(Cv) ∀i ∈ N
if and only if ψ = veto.
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Properties
i) veto(Cv, i), favor(Cv, i) ∈ [0,1]
ii)
1
n
n∑
i=1
veto(Cv, i) = andness(Cv)
iii)
1
n
n∑
i=1
favor(Cv, i) = orness(Cv)
Cv veto(Cv, i) favor(Cv, i)
WAMω
1
2
+
n(ωi − 1/n)
2(n− 1)
1
2
+
n(ωi − 1/n)
2(n− 1)
OWAω
1
n− 1
n∑
j=1
(n− j)ωj
1
n− 1
n∑
j=1
(j − 1)ωj
28
Measure of dispersion
H(v) :=
n∑
i=1
∑
T⊆N\i
(n− t− 1)! t!
n!
h[v(T ∪ i)− v(T )]
where
h(x) =
{−x logn x if x > 0
0 if x = 0
H(v) measures the degree to which the aggregation func-
tion Cv uses its arguments
Properties
i) H(v) ∈ [0,1]
ii) H(vWAMω) = H(vOWAω) = −
n∑
i=1
ωi logn ωi
iii) H(v) = 1 ⇔ v = vAM
iv) H(v) = 0 ⇔ v(S) ∈ {0,1}
⇔ Cv(x) ∈ {x1, . . . , xn}
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Back to the example :
Global importance of criteria
φ(v,St) = 0.292
φ(v,Pr) = 0.292
φ(v,Al) = 0.417
Influence of criteria
I(Cv,St ∪ Pr) = 0.600
I(Cv,St ∪Al) = 0.725
I(Cv,Pr ∪Al) = 0.725
Interaction among criteria
I(v,St ∪ Pr) = −0.25
I(v,St ∪Al) = 0.10
I(v,Pr ∪Al) = 0.10
Conjunction degree
orness(Cv) = 0.517
Veto and favor degrees
veto(Cv,St) = 0.437 favor(Cv,St) = 0.500
veto(Cv,Pr) = 0.437 favor(Cv,Pr) = 0.500
veto(Cv,Al) = 0.575 favor(Cv,Al) = 0.550
Dispersion of the importance of criteria
H(v) = 0.820
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Inverse problem :
How to assess v from the behavior of
the decision maker ?
↓
maximize H(v)
subject to
a Â b (i.e. Cv(19,15,18) > Cv(19,18,15))
d Â c
v(St)
v(Pr)
}
> v(Al) (local importances)
I(v,St ∪ Pr) < 0 (substitutiveness)
0.45 < orness(Cv) < 0.55 (tolerance)
v(∅) = 0, v(N) = 1
Monotonicity of v
etc.
Objective function : strictly concave
Constraints : linear w.r.t. v
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